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ABSTARCT 
 
Currently Pakistan’s economy is under stress and registered a sluggish growth for many years in 
a row. The performance of major economic indicators is not satisfactory. Low investment, 
double digit inflation, fiscal imbalances and low external capital inflows indicates the severity of 
the grave economic situation. This paper investigates fiscal and monetary policy interaction in 
Pakistan using dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. Finding of the paper reveals that 
fiscal and monetary policy interacts with each other and with other macroeconomic variables.  
Inflation responds to fiscal policy shocks in the form of government spending, revenue and 
borrowing shocks.  Monetary authority’s decisions are also affecting fiscal policy variables. It is 
also evident that fiscal discipline is critical for the effective formulation and execution of 
monetary policy.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Currently Pakistan’s economy is under stress and registered a sluggish growth for many 
years in a row. Economy is passing through the difficult time of its history. Outlook is bleak and 
gloomy. The performance of major economic indicators is not satisfactory. Low investment, 
persistent and high inflation, fiscal imbalances and low external capital inflows indicates the 
severity of the grave economic situation. Another important issue is the persistent and continuous 
budget deficit which is the bone of contention between fiscal authority and state bank of 
Pakistan. Persistence budget deficits and government borrowing deters the formulation and 
execution of an independent monetary policy.  
State Bank of Pakistan is adopting tight monetary policy in order to discourage 
government borrowing from the domestic banking system and non-bank financial institutions, 
particularly from the state bank of Pakistan. But even the higher interest rate is not working as 
preventive arms to stop the federal government’s borrowing. There are many reasons, the first 
and at the forefront is the friendly attitude of the State bank of Pakistan. State bank acts amicably 
and never decline Federal government’s demands for fund to bridge the fiscal gap. SBP always 
extends a helping hand by providing the demanded seigniorage to the government. Another issue 
is the non serious attitude of the Federal government.  Fiscal authority and politicians failed to 
stop fiscal slippages and is not serious in ensuring fiscal consolidation and adjustments. Third, 
politicians and treasury benches never allowed SBP to act and operate independently. Numerous 
institutional arrangements are made and number of legislations passed from the parliament for 
the independency and autonomy of State Bank of Pakistan. In 1994 monetary and fiscal policy 
coordination board was formulated for greater cooperation between fiscal and monetary policy. 
But significant lack of coordination has been observed over the years. From 1966 to 2012, these 
authorities coordinated effectively only 13 times to achieve broad macroeconomic goals (see, 
Figure 1 for self explanatory visual representation).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Years of Monetary/Fiscal Policy Coordination in Pakistan 
 
    Source: Arby and Hanif (2010) and Authors’ Calculations up-to Fiscal Year 2012. 
 
However, over the periods, State Bank of Pakistan is trying to implement various policy 
reforms to overcome coordination failure. For example, in 2005, fiscal responsibility and debt 
limitation act was introduced in order to stop budget deficits and to reduce public debt gradually. 
Again On 10 March 2012 president of Pakistan signed and endorsed state bank of Pakistan 
amendment Bill 2012. The objective of the amended draft is to reduce the powers of the 
politicians and treasury to influence monetary authority. The bill also aims to put brakes on 
federal government or other public agencies borrowing from state bank of Pakistan. New bill 
seeks the formulation and execution of monetary policy more independently.  Government of 
Pakistan passed legislation time and again to stop federal government from running excessive 
budget deficits, discourage the accumulation of huge public debt and to provide autonomy to the 
state bank of Pakistan. Unfortunately legislations are not implemented in its true spirit and the 
objectives of these institutional arrangements are not being materialized. Figure 2 shows a 
gradual increase of budget deficit as percent of GDP especially after FY03. In order to finance 
fiscal gap, government mainly rely on borrowing from domestic sources. This figure also shows 
a massive increase in total public sector borrowing as percent of GDP. Figure 3, on the other 
hand shows the process of monetization mainly through government borrowing and its likely 
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consequences on consumer price index (CPI) inflation. The continuous increasing trend in both 
CPI inflation and borrowing behavior pushes central bank to increase its policy discount rate. 
Hence, a war between fiscal and monetary authority over budget deficits and borrowing from 
State Bank of Pakistan drive the debate on the interactions of fiscal and monetary policy. 
 
Figure 2: Public Sector Borrowing, Budget Deficit and Policy Discount Rate 
 
 
 
Figure 3: CPI Inflation, Government Borrowing and Policy Discount Rate 
 
 
Therefore, we investigate in this paper the degree of interaction between fiscal and 
monetary policy. Following Cebi (2012), we modify DSGE model by incorporating public sector 
borrowing in the central bank reaction function. The unrestrained federal government’s 
borrowing from the banking system in general and from State Bank of Pakistan in particular 
forces us to include it in the model. In a recent work, Choudhari and Malik (2012) while 
analyzing the objectives of monetary policy in Pakistan termed government borrowing as a 
constraint on monetary policy. Monetary authority’s choice of policy instrument and the level of 
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inflation are greatly affected by fiscal deficits and it’s financing. This is the main reason that 
forced State Bank to give weight to public finances especially Federal government borrowing 
while formulating and executing monetary policy.  
Economies are changing momentarily. And it is very much difficult to capture all the 
dynamism, features and attributes of these changing economies. But the use of different models 
enables and helps us to get closer to the real picture of the shift in economic environment. 
Tracking the dynamics of fiscal and monetary policy interaction in Pakistan is important because 
fiscal dominancy has important implications and state bank of Pakistan is prone to the significant 
political pressure. Active fiscal policy plays a critical role in the determination of many 
macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, government spending and its revenues decisions and 
frequent intervention from the treasury benches undermine the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
Keeping in perspective the deteriorated fiscal position of the federal government, we modified 
the DSGE model with fiscal and monetary policy constraints. The objective of using DSGE 
model for the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy in Pakistan is to explore avenues for the 
effective formulation and execution of these policies. 
The paper is designed in such a manner that section 2 describes the relevant literature 
review. Section 3 illustrates dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for the interaction of 
fiscal and monetary policies. In Section 4 discuss calibration results and section 5 presents some 
policy prescription in perspective of these findings and wrapping up remarks.    
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Researchers, policy makers and economic managers are increasingly interested in the use 
of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models (DSGE) for macroeconomic analysis.  
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium is relatively complex as compared with earlier models 
for macroeconomic analysis.  This paper uses small scale open economy DSGE model followed 
the one used by Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), Haider and Khan (2008) and Cebi (2012). The 
model is modified by incorporating fiscal authority and especially the federal government 
borrowing. The main drawback of the previous models used for macroeconomic analysis like 
real business cycles is the absence of room for policy intervention. Because RBC suggests that 
business cycles respond to shocks optimally and there is no role of policy makers to play and 
intervene through its policy instrument. On the other hand consensus exists among researcher 
 
 
and academicians that DSGE model is very effective in analyzing the relationships and has the 
immunity against the famous Lucas critique.  
The field is new but quite enough literature is available on DSGE models due to the 
increased interest of policy maker and academicians in this area. The importance of DSGE 
models have forced the central bankers around the world to adopt these models for policy 
making and bring it out from the contours of academic discussion. In the last several years there 
is surprising developments in DSGE modeling. Following the famous Real Business Cycle 
theory, Kydland and Prescott (1982) have started work on DSGE modeling. Dynamic Stochastic 
general equilibrium model heavily based on the new Keynesian set up. New Keynesians school 
of thought provides greater room by assigning an important role to fiscal and monetary policy for 
stabilization. The inclusion of different assumptions largely contributed in the development of 
DSGE model.  
DSGE is frequently used by the central bankers for analyzing the effectiveness of 
monetary policy while the role of fiscal policy is largely ignored. Similarly much of the attention 
has been given to the monetary policy rules. The earlier version of the new Keynesians dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium models have limited role for the fiscal policy. For example, Gali 
(2003) presents a symbolic and narrow role for the fiscal policy.  Ratto et al., (2009) also 
identified that less attention has been given to the public sector and to the interaction of fiscal 
and monetary policy interaction in DSGE models. Muscatelli et al., (2004) investigate the issue 
of fiscal and monetary policy interaction and modified the model by including the extended 
version of fiscal policy transmission channels. They estimated the model instead of calibration. 
Literature also discussed the two policies as strategic substitutes versus strategic complements. 
Charles (1999) explores that fiscal and monetary policy behaves as a strategic substitutes. Hagen 
et al., (2001) termed the relationship between fiscal and monetary authority as an asymmetric. 
This implies that expansionary fiscal policy is accompanied by tight monetary policy stance. 
Muscatelli and Mundschenk (2001) probe that the strategic substitutability of fiscal and 
monetary policy does not applied to the all economies. Melitz (1997) also looked into the matter 
of fiscal and monetary policy but the results are largely ambiguous. It is not clear from his 
findings that the relationship between the policy instruments of the two authorities over the 
period depends on policy or some structural shocks.        
 
 
Strand of literatures also available on the fiscal and monetary policy interaction in a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model focusing a greater role for the fiscal authority. 
Coenen and Straub (2005) realized the active role played by treasury in policy making and its 
impact on the economy. They incorporate active and dominant fiscal policy along non-Ricardian 
consumer into the DSGE model. Keeping the permanent income hypothesis, considerable 
number of economic agents are non-Ricardian in nature against the standard IS curve which 
heavily relied on the assumption of Ricardian equivalence. They investigate consequences of 
active and dominant fiscal policy and find considerable influence of fiscal policy over 
macroeconomic variables. They termed the micro-foundation and optimizing agents based model 
very effective for assessing outcomes of different economic policies. Central bankers in 
developed and developing economies have modified DSGE model according to the prevailing 
situation in their respective economies.  Tovar (2009) suggests that DSGE model is useful in 
exploring the basis of instability, remarkable in the identification of structural changes, estimate 
and anticipate the effects of alternate policy regime. Considerable portion of the existing 
literature is contributed to the panel date but over the years, remarkable contribution by 
researchers has been made to the DSGE modeling and they termed these models equally useful 
for time series data.  Smets and Wouters (2003) allowed for different structural shocks. They 
reveal that beside panel data, DSGE models are able to calculate and predict time series data as 
well. Bernanke et al (1999) also include time series data of financial fractions into DSGE 
models. Cespedes et al., (2004) also investigated DSGE models while incorporating the financial 
sector. They investigated the impact of firm’s balances on the investment. Choi and Cook (2004) 
have incorporated banking sector and examine the performance while using DSGE model. 
Milani (2004) contributed differently by comparing learning and the mechanical source of 
persistence like rational expectation in habit formation or inflation indexation. Davereux and 
Saito (2005) developed an alternate approach that allowed for time-varying portfolio in the 
DSGE models. Engel and Matsumto (2005) kept the center of attention on complete market and 
included assets markets plus portfolio choice in the DSGE model. Devereux and Sutherland 
(2006) further investigated the issue and present a general formula for entire range of assets that 
is compatible with DSGE models.  Fabio and Sala (2006) have added to the literature by 
investigating DSGE model particularly the identifiability and its repercussions for parameter 
estimations. An and Schorfheide (2007) revisited the related literature with DSGE and discuss at 
 
 
length the empirical implications of the model. Christiano et al., (2007) extending the model into 
a small open economy framework and modified the model to include financial friction and 
fraction in the labor market. Adolfson et al (2008) studied DSGE with various assumptions while 
analyzing the impact of monetary policy and transmission of shocks in the economy.   They also 
investigate the trade-off between inflation stabilization as well as output gap stabilization with 
the help of DSGE framework.  
Keeping in perspective the advantages of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
models, both developed and developing economies are formulating DSGE models for their 
economies. The central banks around the world are frequently using these models for analysis 
and diagnosing economic problems and policy formulation. The robustness of the DSGE models 
has derived the debate on the use of these models in emerging economies for policy analysis. 
Following the seminal work of Christiano et al., (2005), Coenen and Straub (2005) and Cebi 
(2012), model used in this thesis is an open economy DSGE model with some modification. We 
modified the model by incorporating federal government borrowing from state bank of Pakistan. 
We investigate the response of domestic output, taxes, inflation, monetary policy instrument and 
other variables to government borrowing shock. We estimate the parameters for the economy of 
Pakistan while using DSGE model in order to be consistent with the micro-foundation of our 
economy.  
We take two policy environments. In the first specification, we calibrate the original 
DSGE model used by Cebi (2012) excluding government borrowing. In the second specification 
some modification has been made while incorporate fiscal policy, particularly federal 
government borrowing from state bank of Pakistan. Recognizing its significance, we check 
technology as well as foreign output shocks, besides fiscal and monetary policy variables shocks.  
 
3.  MODEL SPECIFICATION 
 
We use a small-scale open economy model for Pakistan. Following Cebi (2012), Fragetta 
and Kirsanova (2010), Ortiz et al., (2009), Gali and Monacelli (2005), Fialho and Portugal 
(2005), the model set in motion with infinitely lived household who seeks to maximize the 
expected present discounted value of life time utility subject to inter temporal budget constraint: 
11 1
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Where  1/ 1 t    is the household discount factor and  0,1  ,   is the inverse inters temporal 
elasticity of substitution in consumption,    is inverse labor supply elasticity with respect to real 
wage and   is relative weight on consumption of public goods. The aggregate variables in the 
utility function tt GC ,  and tN are private consumption, government spending and labor supplied 
respectively.  
Household inter-temporal budget constraint:  
The household inter-temporal budget constraint is  
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Where , 1 1/ (1 )t t tQ r   is one period ahead stochastic discount factor, tr is nominal interest rate, T
denote constant lump sum taxes and t  represent income tax rate. tW  is the nominal wage rate, 
tD  is nominal portfolio, tP is consumer price index, tC is composite consumption index which 
consist of index of domestically produced goods  tHC ,  and index of imported goods  tFC , , and 
tG  
is consumption index of public goods. These goods are produced by monopolistically 
competitive firms. 
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A forwarding looking open economy IS curve by solving FOC,s simultaneously is: 
 
   (3) 
 
 
Where 
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And   1 1        
Parameter  0 denotes elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods,   
measures the share of domestic consumption allocated to foreign goods (degree of openness)  
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and   reflects elasticity of substitution between the goods produced in different foreign 
countries. Endogenous variables are defined as follows:  
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The forward looking open economy IS curve is given as: 
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 denote natural rate of output and nominal interest rate. These are the 
equilibrium level of output and interest rate in the absence of nominal rigidities which can be 
described as:  
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Where ta

 is the log of technology process, tA . 
 
Behavior of the firm and price setting: 
Following, Haider and Khan (2008) and Cebi (2012), there is continuum of identical 
monopolistically firms in the economy. These firms produce differentiated products using linear 
technology: 
   
t t t
Y j A N j            (7) 
 
 
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that a fraction  1  of the firm can set a new price in each 
period and a fraction   of them keeps its price unchanged. To take the inflation persistency in 
consideration, we also incorporate backward looking behavior in price setting process by 
following Gali and Gertler (1999) and Cebi (2012): 
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  is the aggregate prices chosen in period 1t  by both 
optimizing (forward looking, 
f
thP 1,  ) and rule of thumb (backward looking, 
b
tHP 1,  )  price setters. 
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) take into account lagged dynamics in the Phillips 
curve. Assuming that a fraction 1  of the firm can set a new price optimally in each period as 
in calvo model, the remaining part   set their prices by using the previous period inflation rate. 
The rule of thumb price setter take into account the past period inflation rate , 1
, 1
, 2
H t
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P
P
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  as well 
as aggregate prices 

1,tHP  occurred in period t-1, when they reset their prices in period t. the 
existence of backward looking firms besides forward looking firms allows us to obtain a log-
linearized open economy hybrid Phillips curve in terms of deviation from steady state: 
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is a log-linearised tax rate.  t represent cost push 
shock which we include in Phillips curve by following, among others, Smet and Wouters (2007) 
Beetsma and Jensen (2004), Ireland (2004), and Fragetta and Kirsanova (2010). Following Smets 
and Wouters (2003) and  Fragetta and Kirsanova (2010). 
 
 
According to equation (10) government spending and income tax as well as output gap directly 
affect inflation via equation (9). The slope coefficient of Phillips curve  shows sensitivity of 
domestic inflation with respect to real marginal cost. 
Monetary policy rule: 
Following Cebi (2012), Haider and Khan (2008) and Smet and Wouters (2007),  we 
define a simple Taylor type interest rate rule based on inflation and output gap (call it 
specification-I): 
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Where 
n
tr

 represent the natural level of nominal interest rate. r  is the interest rate 
smoothing coefficient and lies between zero and one. rt  is interest rate shock and which can be 
interpreted as non systematic part of the monetary policy. Parameters r  and  yr  show the 
central bank preferences about inflation and output gap. Since the main aim of the central bank is 
price stability, the parameter r  should be higher than yr . This kind of monetary policy rule 
implies that Central Banks change nominal interest rates in response to deviation of inflation 
from its steady state value and deviation of output from its natural level. Additionally, Central 
Banks also take into account past value of nominal interest rates (when r   0) when they reset 
their current nominal interest rates. The high value for the degree of interest rate smoothing 
reduces the contemporary responsiveness of the nominal interest rates to inflation and output 
gap. 
Following, Choudhri and Malik (2012) and Kumhof et al. (2008) we also augment Taylor 
Rule with a new variable, that is change in government borrowing. It is well defined in political 
macroeconomic literature, Chari et al (1991), Leeper (1991) and Sims (1994), in the presence of 
fiscal dominance, central bank also put some weight on change in government borrowing while 
setting policy interest rates. The modified version of Taylor rule (call it specification-II) is given 
as: 
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Where, parameters r  is relative weight assigned to change in government borrowing. 
This specification is also consistent with an empirical paper by Malik (2007) for Pakistan 
economy which also considers government borrowing as an important variable while extending 
simple Taylor type monetary policy rule. 
Fiscal Policy rules: 
Following Cebi (2012) and Muscatelli and Tirelli (2005) we consider a backward looking 
form for the fiscal policy reaction function by taking into account lagged responses of fiscal 
policy to economic activity. We also assume smoothing of fiscal instruments, as Favero and 
Monacelli (2005) and Forni, Monetforte and Sessa (2009). 
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Parameters g  and  denote the degree of fiscal smoothing. Parameters yg  and y  demonstrate 
the sensitivities of government spending and tax to past value of output gap. Parameters bg  and 
b  correspond to feedback coefficient on unobservable debt stock. 
g
t  and 
 t  are government 
spending and tax shocks and which represent the non-systematic component of discretionary 
fiscal policy.  
The government solvency constraint: 
Finally the model is completed by fiscal constraint. As in Cebi (2012), Kirsonva et al 
(2007), and Fragetta and Kirsonva (2010) a log-linearised government solvency constraint or 
fiscal constraint can be expressed as: 
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, tB is nominal debt stock. B  is the steady state debt to GDP ratio, 
and C  steady state consumption to GDP ratio. 
4.  CALIBRATION RESULTS  
 
In this section we estimate structural parameters values as well as shocks to the 
parameters.  We do determine some of the values of parameters described in the model and while 
few are taken from other studies in this area particularly that of Haider and Khan (2008), Ahmad 
 
 
et al., (2012), Ahmed, et al., (2012) and Choudhri and Malik (2012). Parameter’s values are 
reported in Table A1. Based on these parameter values, we have calibrated model with two 
monetary policy rules specifications. The statistical result in terms of variance decompositions, 
cross correlations, and autocorrelations are reported in Table A2 to Table A4 and given in 
Appendix section. These results fairly replicate business cycle characteristics of Pakistan 
economy. Now, for policy related discussion, we would like to explain in the results of impulse 
responses to exogenous shocks and want to learn how monetary and fiscal policy interacts to 
each shock.  
Impulse Response Analysis: 
Economic theories identified and recognized numerous shocks. These shocks have 
different implication for different macroeconomic variables. Some affect aggregate supply while 
others affect aggregate demand. Some shock affects both aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply simultaneously.  There are also some sorts of shocks that affect nominal characteristics of 
the economy. Figure A1 to A6 summarizes Calibration and the resulting responses of different 
variable of interest to shocks.   
Response of domestic Output to various shocks 
In Figure A1, the first schematic presentation outlines the response of domestic output to 
technology shock. The figure reveals that output follows the usual behavior and has a positive 
response to technological shock. Level of domestic output deviates from the steady state as the 
technology shock hits the economy. In the beginning the output increase abruptly and formed a 
hum shaped. The response of domestic output also shows a high degree of persistence as it does 
not returns back to its steady state up to 16 quarters. We know that DSGE model is largely based 
on micro foundation and have the attributes of real business cycle. The response of domestic 
output to positive technological shocks is large and considerable. This is compatible with the 
existing literature as standard economic theory considers technological advancement as positive 
supply shock.  
Second figure shows the response of domestic output to world output shocks. It is a well 
documented fact that no single country is cut off from the outside world in the current globalized 
world.  Higher degree of financial integration and improved means of transportation and 
communication expose economies to external shocks. Mundell-Fleming model explores the 
vulnerability of domestic economy to shocks, especially world output and world interest rate 
 
 
shocks. These shocks are supposed to be transmitted from one economy to another. Our 
economy is also vulnerable and exposed to external shock in the world economy. Keeping in 
view the limitation of this thesis, we just incorporate world output shock. We employed a small 
open economy DSGE model. Figure shows that domestic output responds positively to world 
output shock. In the beginning domestic output rises sharply and remains above its steady state 
level for 6 quarters. Then it decline for a very short period and abruptly converges to its steady 
state.    
The third graph shows the response of domestic output to inflation shock. High price 
level damages the macroeconomic performance of the country.  When inflation hits the 
economy, output starts to decline and it remains below steady state for sufficiently long period of 
time. The decline in output is considerable up to three quarters and then it starts rising but never 
return to its steady state till 16 quarters. It implies that decline in output in response to 
inflationary shock is highly persistence in Pakistan. Our calibration follows the exact 
specification of Cebi. There are at least three major channels through which higher prices effect 
output level in the economy. First, an increase in the price level reduces consumer’s wealth that 
discourages them to spend less. A decrease in consumer’s purchasing power reduces demand in 
the economy resulting a fall in the output. Second, higher price in the economy induces the 
central bank to adopt tight monetary policy by increasing interest rate in the economy. Cost of 
doing business goes up as the capital gets expensive with the higher interest rate. This crowded 
private investment spending and reduces the overall level of output in the economy. There is 
another channel through which higher prices discourages domestic output. When there is 
inflationary pressure in the economy and the price level is rising, domestic currency appreciates 
which in turn discourage exports. Economic activities decrease with a fall in exports causes a 
decline in the domestic output. Furthermore, inflation causes the value of the currency to 
decrease. People start spending their savings in the presence of inflationary pressure in the 
economy. Lower saving in the country also leads to a decrease in investment and discourages 
capital accumulation. The long term productivity falls that ultimately causes lower level of 
domestic output.  So inflation has negative impacts and hinders economic growth. 
In the next schematic presentation we investigate the response of domestic output to 
monetary policy. Interest rate is an important factor in the determination of output and economic 
growth. In our analysis the response of domestic output to monetary policy shock is negative. 
 
 
Domestic output falls with the tight monetary policy stance of the state bank of Pakistan. Output 
declines and remained below steady state up to 4 quarters. After 4 quarters domestic output starts 
rising but it again die out very quickly. The high responsiveness of output to monetary policy 
shock implies that nominal rigidity is not hold too much in Pakistan. Because if prices are sticky 
then output is not responsive too much to monetary policy shock. It means that prices are highly 
flexible in Pakistan. One policy implication of the flexible prices is that policy’s role and 
effectiveness declines in a more volatile price environment. Second policy implication 
necessitates reforms in the behavior of interest rate. Interest rate reforms are critical because the 
decision of the state bank of Pakistan regarding interest rate has critical implications for the 
investment and economic activities in the country.   Higher interest rate increases the cost of 
doing business. Investors are unable to get cheap loans from the banking system in the presence 
of higher interest rate. This harms Capital accumulation and ultimately growth in the country.  
Our analysis also uncovers a decline in output in response to positive fiscal shock in the 
form of higher taxes. Domestic output declines in the beginning and remain below its steady 
state for a short period. Output came back to its steady state and rises for two quarters and again 
die out very quickly. There are different transmission channels through which fiscal policy 
shocks, tax shocks, affect output. Imposition of higher tax has legitimate economic and business 
cost. Higher taxes increase price level. Higher prices and inflationary pressure in the economy 
discourage productive activities and causes output to fall. Higher taxes also discourage labor 
supply and employees have less incentive to work and earn more.  Furthermore, tax shocks also 
distort price signals and compel rational agent to substitute goods bearing lower taxes. Similarly 
higher taxes discourage producers to invest and accumulate capital further. This implies that tax 
shocks slow the process of economic growth and cause the domestic output to decline. The 
findings are very much consistent with the standard economic literature. 
We also investigate the response of domestic output to government spending shocks. 
Government spends money on the purchase of goods and services. Government also incurs 
expenditures on the development of infrastructures and carrying out public investments. Beside 
these expenditures, government also spends money on transfer payments. Transfer payments 
increases the availability of funds and purchasing power of the individuals. People spend more as 
they gets more money through transfer payments. So government spending promotes economic 
activity and influences growth. In the beginning domestic output expands in response to 
 
 
government spending shock. Output remains above its steady state level. It comes down to its 
steady state after 3 quarters and stayed there for seven quarters. Domestic output again converge 
to its steady state and remained there. We know that if the government has not enough resources, 
then its continuous spending undermines growth.  Government extracts resources from the more 
productive sectors of the economy to finance its spending on less productive activities. So in the 
beginning government spending maximizes output but then it declines because expenditures are 
misallocated.  This implies that fiscal shock, both higher spending and higher taxes, bring 
considerable volatility to domestic output.  We know that volatility in the country reduces the 
impact of nominal variables on real variables. The impact of financial sector of the economy, 
monetary policy, has lesser impact on the real sector of the economy, fiscal policy. The impact of 
policy intervention reduces considerably in the presence of volatility. Government must 
rationalize its spending and its revenue behavior in order to improve the policy environment.  
If we compare the two specifications, it is visible that tax shocks and government 
spending shocks has a limited influence over output in the first specification. In Cebi’s 
specification, he does not incorporate government borrowing from the central bank. Output 
remains tied to its steady state for almost 16 quarters and fiscal shock has a negligible influence 
over domestic output. This implies that federal government borrowing in Pakistan is critical 
variable that affect macroeconomic variables and the overall performance.   
Response of Inflation to various shocks 
In Figure A2, we trace the responsiveness of inflation to different shock, particularly shock to 
fiscal and monetary policy. In the first schematic presentation we report the response of inflation 
to technology shock. Technology advancement has a considerable impact on output and 
ultimately on inflation in the country. With a technology shock, inflation reduces because less 
units of effective inputs are needed to produce the same output. Inflation reduces considerably 
and remains below its steady state for very long period. It converges to its steady state almost 
after 15 quarters. We have very interesting findings. If we compare the two specifications, it is 
visible that when technology shock hits the economy, decline in inflation in Cebi specification is 
not as much robust as in our case. This may be due to the inclusion of government borrowing 
from state bank of Pakistan that is largely ignores by Cebi. Cebi’s model does not consider 
government borrowing. This shows that technological shock has greater impact in the presence 
of government borrowing and fiscal policy is more effective. Inflation reduces to a greater extent 
 
 
in our scheme of things compare to the original model. This implies a greater role of fiscal policy 
in collecting the positive spillovers of the technological shocks. 
Positive world output shock causes prices in the international market to rise. The 
increased economic and productivity activities leads to the rise in price of different commodity 
and especially oil prices. Pakistan imports a major share of oil from the international markets. 
Any increase in the world oil price has a consequential impact on the economy of Pakistan in 
general and inflation in particular. The figure shows that domestic price level in the economy is 
highly responsive. Inflation remains it steady state for a very long period and do not converges to 
its steady state up to 16 quarters.  Any rise in the world output and commodity prices cause drive 
up the cost of factors of production. This has considerable impact on production and ultimately 
on inflation. World output shock also causes food prices to rise 
 Next we document the response of inflation to monetary policy shock. Impulse response 
function shows a significant decline in inflation in response to monetary policy shock. When 
monetary policy shock hits the economy, inflation declines and it remains below its steady state 
for sufficiently long period of time. The figure shows that inflation never returns to its steady 
state  up to 16 quarters. This implies that tight monetary policy stance of state bank of Pakistan is 
effective in controlling inflation in the country. This also contradicts findings of the Javid and 
Munir (2010).  there are many possible explanations. First, data covering period as well as the 
frequency of the data different. Second reason is the issue of Prize puzzle in DSGE model 
discussed by Rabanal (2007). the second interesting thing between the two specification is that in 
our case government has state bank of Pakistan has assigned weights to federal government from 
the central bank as well as from the domestic commercial banks.  Cebi model has not includes 
government borrowing from the central bank and the response of inflation to tight monetary 
policy shock as not significant as that in our case. In our case monetary policy is more effective 
when it takes into accounts the government borrowing.   
The next figure shows that a fiscal policy shocks, tax shocks, cause price level in the 
economy to rise. Inflation is highly responsive to tax shock and it remains above the steady state 
level. The response is also very persistent as remains there for sufficiently long time as positive 
government tax shock persist, and never return to its steady state up to 16 quarters. Tax rise 
increases the cost of production. Producers normally shift the incidents of taxation to the final 
consumers by including taxes in the prices thus resulting upward pressure in price level in the 
 
 
economy. When tax shocks hit the economy, price level rises in the economy. If we compare our 
findings with Cebi’s findings, it is visible that elasticity of inflation with respect to price level in 
our economy is high. This implies that in our country producers largely add taxes to the prices of 
their commodity and bear less or no burden themselves.  
In the next figure, we investigate response of inflation to government spending in the 
country.   Price level stays above its steady state for very low period and comes to its steady state 
after 2 and half quarters. Then the price level start declines. One of the possible explanation for 
the falling prices after 8 months is the positive impact of government spending on output. Our 
results also reveals that output rises with the rise in government spending. Inflation level declines 
in the economy with the increased availability of goods and services. 
From this figure we observed that contractionary or tight monetary policy reduces 
inflation while expansionary fiscal policy leads a price hike in the economy. This implies that 
fiscal and monetary policy works in the opposite direction and the situation demands for greater 
cooperation between fiscal and monetary authority in Pakistan. 
Response of Interest Rate to various Shocks 
In Figure A3, we investigate monetary policy response to different shocks. In the first 
figure, we analyzes the response of interest rate to technology shocks.  A positive technological 
shock increase the interest rate in the beginning and remain above its steady state up to two 
quarters. After that it immediately decline and stayed below the steady state for sufficiently long 
period of time. Interest rate not come back to the steady state even up to 16 quarters.  This 
implies that monetary policy is expansionary in response to positive technology shock. 
We also investigate the response of monetary policy to inflation shock in the economy. 
State bank of Pakistan response positively by increasing the interest rate to contain the 
inflationary pressure in the economy. Interest rate response actively and remain above its steady 
state and not comes to its steady state up to 16 quarters. Purchasing power of money erodes with 
price hike in the economy. So in order to control the erosion of purchasing power of domestic 
currency and to bring price stability in the country, state bank increase its policy instrument in 
response to inflation shock.  
We further investigate the response of monetary policy to fiscal policy shock. We check 
both tax as well as government spending shock. Interest rate rises in response to tax shocks. 
Interest rate rise and it remains above its steady state for sufficiently long period of time. The 
 
 
response of monetary policy is significantly persistent. These are very interesting findings. If we 
compare the two specifications, it is clear that response of interest rate is not significant in Cebi’s 
specification. His findings are more accurate and validate economic theory. According his 
findings central bank should not increase interest rate if government obtains revenue from taxes. 
Obtaining revenues from increased taxes means a contractionary fiscal policy. So it suggests an 
expansionary monetary policy in order to offset the negative spillovers of the contractionary 
fiscal policy. But in our case, state bank of Pakistan increases interest rate along higher tax rates. 
This implies that both fiscal and monetary authority follow contractionary policies and are 
making their policies independently. This should not be the case. If the fiscal branch is following 
tight fiscal policy then state bank of Pakistan must adopt loose monetary policy. There is a room 
for fiscal and monetary policy coordination because both higher interest rate and higher taxes 
badly effect the macroeconomic performance of the country.  
Here it is also very important to compare the two specifications. In Cebi’s specification, 
he does not assigned any weight to government borrowing. In his set up, the response of interest 
rate to technology shock is not considerable and it fell slightly. This also supports the finding of 
Clarida et al., (1999) that central bank is not fully accommodative to technology and the 
monetary policy is not highly responsive. The response of interest rate remains flat for 
sufficiently long period of time. In our specification, we incorporate government sector and gave 
weight to federal government borrowing from state bank of Pakistan. In this case interest rate 
rises in the beginning, but it should not be the case. Because, according to Cebi’s specification if 
government increases government taxes, then the central bank is supposed not to increase 
interest rate. But in our case it is increases which is not good for the economy.    
Response of Government Borrowing to various Shocks 
In Figure A4, we investigate the response of government borrowing to different shocks. 
The response of government borrowing to inflation in positive. When there is inflation shock in 
the economy, government borrowing increases. It increases and remained above itssteadystrate 
up to 7 quarters. After 7 quarters the government borrowing comes to its steadytate and stayed 
there afterward till 16 quarters.   The main reason is that government is now paying more and 
incurred extra expenditure for the same goods and services.  
Next we examine the response of government borrowing to monetary policy shocks. 
Government borrowing decreases in respone of interestrate shock. Government  borrowing lies 
 
 
below its steady state up to 5 quarters. Then itcomes to its steady state and remained there up to 
16 quarters. State bank of Pakistan knows that budget deficits and borrowing of the federal 
government from state bank creating many problems. In order to contain excessive government 
borrowing and the ruthless use of public exchequer. State bank of Pakistan keeps the discount 
rate high in order to avoid panic and stress and to force the federal government to adopt 
appropriate behavior by rationalizing its messy spending.  
We also examine the response of government debt to tax shock. Government borrowing 
increases in response to a positive tax shock and remain above its steady state up to 6 quarters 
and then it joins its steady state level. There are many reasons for the positive response of 
government borrowing to tax shock. First tax erodes production activities and discourage capital 
accumulation. Low economic activities reduces government revenue from taxation and borrow 
from the banking system in order to finance its expenditure. Second, tax revenue is not enough to 
finance excessive federal government spending. If government expenditures are more than its 
revenues, then government borrowing increases along with higher taxes in the country.  
We also investigate the response of government borrowing from state bank of Pakistan to 
fiscal shocks called government spending shock. Government borrowing decreases and stays 
below its steady state till 16 quarters. The response shows very persistent behavior. There are 
many possible justifications for the negative response of government borrowing from state bank 
of Pakistan to government spending shock. For example, when the federal government increases 
its spending and the expenditure are greater than the revenue generated from taxes, then 
government resort state bank for providing money. State bank of Pakistan in return keeps the 
discount rate higher in order to restrict government borrowing from state bank of Pakistan. In 
this case it seems that monetary policy of state bank of Pakistan is effective in controlling federal 
government borrowing from the state bank. Another justification is that government borrows 
from external sources in order to finance its spending.   
Response of Government Spending to various Shocks 
In Figure A5, we trace the response of government spending to different shocks in the 
economy. A rise in total factor productivity or technology shock causes domestic output to 
increase. In the first figure, response of government spending to technology shock is positive. 
Government spending deviates and remain above its steady state for many periods and never 
returned to steady state up to 16 quarters. This implies that there is a positive relationship 
 
 
between government spending and positive technology shocks. This shows a procyclical fiscal 
policy behavior in pakistan. In earlier figure we noticed that output respond significantly to 
technology shocks. When economic activities stimulates in the country, government revenue also 
increases, enabling the government to spend more and more on the welfare of its public. 
Government may increase new projects and develop new infrastructures. All this will increase 
government spending.   
Government spending also increases in response to a positive world output shocks. 
Initially government spending remains above its steady state for almost 10 quarters. After 10 
quarters , the shocks causes government spending to comes to its steady state and remain there 
up to 16 quarters.   
In the next figure we investigate the response of  government spending to inflation is 
positive. It means that in the presence of inflationary pressure in the economy, the government 
expenditure increases. Just like individual consumers, higher prices also hurt purchasing power 
of the government because rising prices means paying more for the same amount of goods and 
services. In the beginning, inflation shock stimulates government spending and is rising up to 3 
quarters. After 3 quarters it started declining and reached to steady state after 12 quarters and 
stay there.  
In the next figure we investigate the response of government spending to monetary policy 
shock.. state bank of Pakistan adopt tight monetary policy by keeping interest rate high in order 
to control the ruthless spending and government borrowing from the central and commercial 
banks. The analysis shows that state bank policy is effective to some extent in containing 
government spending. Monetary policy mainly influence aggregate demand and we know that 
government spending is an important element of aggregate demand equation. Government 
spending reduces to monetary policy shock and it declines up to 11 quarters and then it reaches 
to its steady state. 
In the next  figure we analyzed the response of government spending to tax revenue 
shocks. It is visible from the figure that government increases public spending in response to a 
positive tax shock. Government spending rises till nine quarter and then it comes to its steady 
state and stayed there up to 16 quarters. When government’s revenues increases from taxes, 
additional resources are now available making it easy and possible for the government to fund its 
project and exiting programs. This implies that a rise in tax revenue exert extra pressure on 
 
 
government to carry out additional public spending.  It implies that government spending is 
elastic and respond to tax revenue shocks. 
Response of Government Revenue to various Shocks 
Technology shocks play an important role and bring business fluctuation and economic 
volatility. Our analysis shows that government revenue responds to technology shocks (Figure 
A6). Total factor productivity and economic activities increase with a positive technology shock. 
Income level of the economy rises. Tax revenue also increases with the rise in income in the 
presence of any of the two tax system, constant or progressive tax system.  
We also trace the response of tax revenue to inflation. Cost of production increase with 
inflation and discourages output. Aggregate supply shrinking. In the presence of high and 
volatile inflation in the economy, the producer increases the wages of the employee as the 
workers often demand for increased wages. Higher price means reduction in the purchasing 
power and discourage consumer spending. Agents are now paying more for goods and services.  
Higher prices restrict output and reduce production. This dampen economic growth and cause 
government revenue from taxes. In the start tax revenue increase with price shock. This validate 
economic theory. In the beginning, price shock maximizes producer’s profit and they respond to 
it by increasing production. This increase tax revenue in the short run. But this rise in the 
revenue persist for a short period of two quarters and it die out very quickly. It remains below its 
steady state for sufficiently large period of time and never retuned to steady state till 16 quarters.   
The response of tax revenue to monetary policy shock is significant. Quantitative 
tightening in the form of reduced money supply or higher interest rate increase the cost of doing 
business and discourage economic activities. Higher interest rate also crowd out private 
investment. In order to control the inflationary pressure in the economy, state bank of Pakistan 
raises the interest rate and reduces the amount of lending. Business find it harder to get easy and  
cheap credit halting economic activities to stimulate. Cost of doing business goes up. Production 
activities  declines and so government revenue. Higher interest rate also discourage consumers 
spending. People now spend less and increases their saving. Lower economic activities reduces 
government revenue from taxes. Tax revenue decreases up to 5 quarters. Tax revenue becomes to 
its steady state and remained there till 16 quarters.  
We also investigate the response of tax revenues to government spending shock. 
Government spending increase budget deficit and interest rate. As government spending 
 
 
increases, borrowing from state bank and other commercial banks also rises. This drives up 
interest rate higher which increases the cost of capital. Investment crowded out and ultimately 
productivity activities decline with the rising interest rate. Tax revenue also decreases with 
slower economic activities. In our analysis response of tax revenue is considerable to 
government spending shocks. Tax revenues deviate from steady state and not return to steady 
state till 16 quarter. 
 
5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we attempt to model the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy in 
Pakistan in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model.  In this scheme of things, we permit 
and assign a bigger role to the fiscal policy and government borrowing. Our findings reveal that 
fiscal and monetary policy interacts in Pakistan.  
The key findings of our analysis reveal that fiscal and monetary policy interacts with each 
others in response to shocks to different variables. We also include, government borrowing, 
technology as well as foreign output shock besides fiscal and monetary policy shocks. Briefly 
speaking the behavior of domestic output follows the usual behavior and has a positive response 
to technological shock. Level of domestic output deviates from the steady state as the technology 
shock hits the economy. Domestic output also shows a high degree of persistence. DSGE model 
is largely based on micro foundation and have the attributes of real business cycle. The response 
of domestic output to positive technological shocks is large and considerable and is compatible 
with the existing literature as standard economic theory considers technological advancement a 
positive supply shock. Our findings show that domestic output responds positively to world 
output shock. Our calibration goes and investigates the response of domestic output to 
inflationary shock. When inflation hits the economy, output starts to decline and it remains 
below steady state for sufficiently long period of time. The decline in output is considerable up 
to three quarters and then it starts rising but never return to its steady.  Decline in output in 
response to inflationary shock is highly persistence in Pakistan. 
 Interest rate is an important factor in the determination of output and economic growth. 
In our analysis the response of domestic output to monetary policy shock is negative and 
domestic output falls with the tight monetary policy stance of the state bank of Pakistan. The 
high responsiveness of output to monetary policy shock implies that nominal rigidity is not hold 
 
 
too much in Pakistan. This has very critical and important policy implications. First, role of 
economic policy declines in the absence of nominal rigidity and more volatile environment. 
Second policy implication necessitates reforms in the behavior of interest rate. Interest rate 
reforms are critical because the decision of the state bank of Pakistan regarding interest rate has 
critical implications for the investment and economic activities in the country.   Our analysis also 
uncovers a decline in output in response to fiscal shock in the form of higher taxes. We also 
investigate the response of domestic output to government spending shocks. Domestic output 
expands in response to government spending shock as increased government spending promotes 
economic activities and influences growth.  
In Pakistan, technology advancement has a considerable impact on output and ultimately 
on inflation in the country. With a technology shock, inflation reduces because fewer units of 
effective inputs are needed to produce the same output. Inflation reduces considerably in 
response to technology shock. We also find that government spending responds positively and 
has increased with the introduction of new technology. This implies a greater role of fiscal policy 
in collecting the positive spillovers of the technological shocks. Inflation is also significantly 
responsive to monetary policy shock. When monetary policy shock hits the economy, inflation 
declines and it remains below its steady state for sufficiently long period of time. Tight monetary 
policy stance of state bank of Pakistan is effective in controlling inflation in the country. This 
contradicts findings of Javid and Munir (2010) where they find that phenomenon of price puzzle 
exists in Pakistan and monetary policy is not effective. Results also show that monetary policy is 
more effective when state bank gives weight to federal government borrowing. This means that 
state bank of Pakistan must give weight to fiscal policy in designing its objective function while 
formulating monetary policy. Inflation is also highly responsive to both the instruments of fiscal 
policy shocks. Price level in the economy rises with a surge in taxes. Elasticity of inflation with 
respect to taxes in Pakistan’s economy is high. This implies that producers largely add taxes to 
the prices of their commodity and bear less or no burden themselves. Inflation is also responsive 
and deviates from its equilibrium state with increased government spending. Contractionary or 
tight monetary policy reduces inflation while expansionary fiscal policy leads a price hike in the 
economy indicating that both fiscal and monetary policy works in the opposite direction and the 
situation demands for greater cooperation between fiscal and monetary authority in Pakistan. 
 
 
Inspecting the response of monetary policy to inflation shock in the economy unveil that 
state bank of Pakistan response positively by increasing the interest rate to contain the 
inflationary pressure in the economy. Examining monetary policy response to different shocks 
disclose that a positive technology shock increase the policy rate. Monetary policy also respond 
to fiscal policy shocks as state bank increases its policy rate to counter the negatives associated 
with excessive federal government spending. Fiscal policy also responds to monetary policy 
instruments. Government borrowing from state bank reduces with high policy rate. It means that 
monetary policy is effective in controlling fiscal profligacy. On the other hand federal 
government borrowing rises with inflation. Government borrowing also increases in response to 
a positive tax shock. A rise in total factor productivity or technology shock causes government 
spending to deviates and remains above its steady state indicating the pro-cyclicality of fiscal 
policy in Pakistan. Government revenue rises with stimulating economic activities that enables 
the government to spend more and more on the welfare of its public.  Government spending to 
inflation is highly elastic and increases in the presence of inflationary pressure in the economy. 
Preserving price stability is critical in order to reduce the burden on already squeezed treasury. 
Government expenditures are also elastic and public spending surge in response to a positive tax 
shock. Tax revenue also responds negatively to inflation. Tax is very important instrument of the 
fiscal policy and we report a significant response of tax to monetary policy shock. Quantitative 
tightening in the form of reduced money supply or higher interest rate increase the cost of doing 
business and discourage economic activities. Lower economic activities reduce government 
revenue from taxes. The response of tax revenues to government spending shock is negative.  
Keeping the above discussion in perspective, we come to the conclusion that fiscal and 
monetary policy interacts with each other in Pakistan. So greater coordination between treasury 
benches and state bank of Pakistan is needed in order to increase the effectiveness of fiscal and 
monetary policy in the country.   
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RESULTS APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1: Selection of Parameter Values 
 
 
  
 
 
Table A2: Variance Decomposition 
 
 
 
Specification 1: without government borrowing 
 
                   
     99.21 0.23 0.50 0.05 0.00 0.00 
   99.02 0.65 0.21 0.06 0.02 0.03 
   31.43 1.36 0.49 0.01 66.70 0.00 
   0.01 0.01 99.83 0.08 0.08 0.00 
   0.46 0.03 3.01 96.50 0.01 0.00 
   0.08 0.10 98.42 1.01 0.38 0.00 
 
 
 
 
 
Specification 2: with government borrowing 
 
                   
     81.43 0.29 17.98 0.31 0.00 0.00 
   64.91 0.14 33.37 1.56 0.01 0.01 
   25.14 0.93 19.03 0.50 54.41 0.00 
   0.01 0.01 99.82 0.09 0.08 0.00 
   0.44 0.02 2.92 96.60 0.01 0.00 
   0.08 0.09 98.52 0.92 0.38 0.00 
  
 
 
 
Table A3: Matrix of Correlation 
 
 
 
Specification 1: without government borrowing 
 
                   
     1.00 0.99 -0.55 -0.06 -0.03 0.08 
   0.99 1.00 -0.57 -0.03 -0.34 0.06 
   -0.55 -0.57 1.00 0.08 0.03 0.00 
   -0.06 -0.03 0.08 1.00 -0.15 -0.96 
   -0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.15 1.00 0.27 
   0.08 0.06 0.00 -0.96 0.27 1.00 
 
 
 
 
Specification 2: with government borrowing 
 
                   
     1.00 0.86 -0.41 -0.24 0.02 0.27 
   0.86 1.00 -0.58 -0.46 0.15 0.51 
   -0.41 -0.58 1.00 0.08 0.01 -0.05 
   -0.24 -0.46 0.08 1.00 -0.14 -0.99 
   0.02 0.15 0.01 -0.14 1.00 0.25 
   0.27 0.51 -0.05 -0.99 0.25 1.00 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Table A4: Autocorrelations 
 
 
 
Specification 1: without government borrowing 
Order 1 2 3 4 5 
     0.922 0.792 0.655 0.530 0.424 
   0.925 0.796 0.660 0.535 0.429 
   0.967 0.919 0.868 0.822 0.780 
   0.931 0.810 0.678 0.554 0.446 
   0.438 0.158 0.058 0.026 0.015 
   0.844 0.694 0.562 0.451 0.358 
 
Specification 2: with government borrowing 
Order 1 2 3 4 5 
     0.933 0.816 0.690 0.572 0.468 
   0.814 0.688 0.589 0.504 0.430 
   0.824 0.730 0.676 0.640 0.614 
   0.923 0.793 0.655 0.530 0.422 
   0.438 0.168 0.068 0.032 0.018 
   0.904 0.771 0.636 0.515 0.412 
 
  
 
 
Figure A1: Response of Domestic Output 
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Figure A2: Response of Domestic Inflation 
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Figure A3: Response of Interest Rate 
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Figure A4: Response of Government Borrowing 
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Figure A5: Response of Government Spending 
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Figure A6: Response of Tax Revenue 
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